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In Theorem 1 of the main article, we characterise the maximal set of parameters for
existence of an honest equilibrium, which is obtained by assuming that pi∗Bb(0) = 0 and
thus, V ∗h (0) = `/(1 − δ) = V ∗` (0). This implies a discontinuity of V ∗h at µ = 0 because i)
V ∗h (µ) = hp
∗
G(µ) + δhV
∗
h (pi
∗
Gg(µ)) + δ(1−h)V ∗h (pi∗Bb(µ)) for µ > 0 and ii) limµ→0 pi∗Bb(µ) > 0
as implied by the fact that p∗G(µ) = δ(V
∗
` (pi
∗
Bb(µ))−V ∗` (0)) ≥ ` for all µ ∈ (0, µ¯). However,
an honest equilibrium without such a discontinuity also exists if
h >
1 +
√
1 + 4`2 + 4`3
2 + 2`
, (1)
which is a sufficient condition1 that guarantees optimality of truth-telling for an h-type
seller when we set pi∗Bb(0) = limµ→0 pi
∗
Bb(µ) > 0 and thus, an h-type seller would tell the
truth even at µ = 0 by continuity. The value functions of such an equilibrium are identical
to V ∗` and V
∗
h that we obtained for Theorem 1 in the main article, except for the value of
V ∗h (0) which is now higher at limµ→0 V
∗
h (µ). To indicate this difference, we denote h-type’s
equilibrium value function in the current case as V˜ ∗h . We first state and prove this result
in Proposition 1 below, which will be used in the main contents of this online Appendix
that ensue, namely, the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 of the main article.
Proposition 1 If (1) holds and δ is large enough, there exists an honest equilibrium in
which an h-type seller announces truthfully even when µ = 0. The value functions V ∗` and
V˜ ∗h are continuous on [0, 1].
Proof. Let y∗, p∗ and pi∗ be the same as those in the proof of Theorem 1 with the following
modification: in the off-equilibrium contingency that a bad quality is truthfully announced
when µ = 0, the reputation is updated to p˜i∗Bb(0) = limµ→0 piBb(µ, y
∗(µ)). Then, V ∗` is also
the same as in Theorem 1 and optimality of an `-type seller’s announcement strategy is
1An alternative but more tedious proof available upon request shows that a weaker sufficient condition
is h > 1/(2− `).
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verified by the same argument as that in the proof of Theorem 1, except for the case that
q = b when µ = 0. In this latter case, lying and telling the truth are equivalent for an
`-type seller by continuity because the same is true when q = b for all µ ∈ (0, µ¯) as shown
in the main article if δ > δ`, hence y
∗(0) = 1 is optimal.
The value function of an h-type from always telling the truth is V˜ ∗h (µ) = V
∗
h (µ) for
µ > 0 as obtained in the proof of Theorem 1. So, we use V˜ ∗h and V
∗
h interchangeably for
µ > 0 for easy reference to earlier results on V ∗h . We set V˜
∗
h (0) = limµ→0 V
∗
h (µ). We will
first prove that
V ∗h (µ)− V˜ ∗h (0) > V ∗` (µ)− V ∗` (0) ∀µ > 0 (2)
for sufficiently large δ < 1, then establish optimality of truth-telling for h-type.
Denote the ex-ante payoff from the possibility of always drawing q = g as
V oh (µ) := h
∞∑
t=0
htδtpG
(
pitGg(µ), y
∗(pitGg(µ))
) ∀µ > 0,
so that
V ∗h (µ) = V
o
h (µ) + (1− h)δ
∞∑
t=0
htδtV ∗h
(
piBb(pi
t
Gg(µ), y
∗(pitGg(µ))
) ∀µ > 0 (3)
and
dV ∗h (µ)
dµ
>
dV oh (µ)
dµ
for almost all µ > 0 because V ∗h is strictly increasing
2 and so do pitGg(µ)
and pi∗Bb(µ) (this follows from Lemmas 5 and 6 in the Appendix A.3 of the main article).
In conjunction with (31) in the Appendix A.3, we have
V oh (µ)− V ∗` (µ) =
[ ∞∑
t=0
(ht+1 − `t)δtpG
(
pitGg(µ), y
∗(pitGg(µ))
)]− δV ∗` (0) 1− `1− δ`.
For µ ≥ µ¯, since y∗(µ) = 1 we have
dV oh (µ)
dµ
− dV
∗
` (µ)
dµ
=
∞∑
t=0
(ht+1 − `t)δt∂pG
(
pitGg(µ), 1
)
∂µ
dpitGg(µ)
dµ
(4)
=
∞∑
t=0
δ2t
[
(h2t+1 − `2t)∂pG
(
pi2tGg(µ), 1
)
∂µ
dpi2tGg(µ)
dµ
+ δ(h2t+2 − `2t+1)∂pG
(
pi2t+1Gg (µ), 1
)
∂µ
dpi2t+1Gg (µ)
dµ
]
>
∞∑
t=0
δ2t`2t
[
(h− 1)∂pG
(
pi2tGg(µ), 1
)
∂µ
dpi2tGg(µ)
dµ
+ δ(h2 − `)∂pG
(
pi2t+1Gg (µ), 1
)
∂µ
dpi∗Gg(pi
2t
Gg(µ))
dµ
dpi2tGg(µ)
dµ
]
. (5)
2This is because p∗G(·) is strictly increasing and V ∗h (µ) is the same probabilistic sum of pG(·)’s across
the posteriors after possible future histories from the current reputation µ, each of which is an increasing
function of µ.
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As an intermediate step to determining the sign of (5), we calculate
(h− 1)∂pG
(
µ, 1
)
∂µ
+ (h2 − `)∂pG
(
pi∗Gg(µ), 1
)
∂µ
dpi∗Gg(µ)
dµ
= −h(1− h)(1− `)
(1− (1− h)µ)2 +
h2(h2 − `)(1− `)`
(`(1− µ) + h2µ)2 , (6)
the derivative of which is
−2(1− `) h(1− h)
2
(1− (1− h)µ)3 −
`(h3 − h`)2
(`(1− µ) + h2µ)3 < 0. (7)
It is routinely verified that (6) evaluated at µ = 1 is positive if (1) holds and thus, (6) is
positive for all µ due to (7). This further implies that (5) is positive for all µ ≥ µ¯ when
δ < 1 is sufficiently close to 1 and consequently, because
dV ∗h (µ)
dµ
>
dV oh (µ)
dµ
as asserted above,
dV ∗h (µ)
dµ
≥ dV
∗
` (µ)
dµ
∀µ ≥ µ¯. (8)
Next, let µm = min{µ|pi∗Gg(µ) ≥ µ¯ and piBb(µ, y∗(µ)) ≥ µ¯} and consider µ ∈ [µm, µ¯].
Note that µm < µ¯ due to Lemmas 4 and 5 of the Appendix A.3 of the main article. Since
V ∗h (µ) = hpG(µ, y
∗(µ)) + δ
(
hV ∗h (pi
∗
Gg(µ)) + (1− h)V ∗h (piBb(µ, y∗(µ)))
)
and
V ∗` (µ) = pG(µ, y
∗(µ)) + δ
(
`V ∗` (pi
∗
Gg(µ)) + (1− `)V ∗` (0)
)
,
we deduce that
dV ∗h (µ)
dµ
− dV ∗` (µ)
dµ
, which exists almost everywhere because both V ∗h (µ) and
V ∗` (µ) are continuous and increasing, is equal to the derivative of
(1− h)(δV ∗h (piBb(µ, y∗(µ)))− pG(µ, y∗(µ)))+ δ(hV ∗h (pi∗Gg(µ))− `V ∗` (pi∗Gg(µ))),
which is positive due to (8) because pG(µ, y
∗(µ)) = δ
(
V ∗` (piBb(µ, y
∗(µ)))−V ∗` (0)
)
for µ ≤ µ¯.
Repeated application of analogous argument establishes that
dV ∗h (µ)
dµ
>
dV ∗` (µ)
dµ
for all µ > 0
when δ < 1 is large enough so long as (1) holds. This proves (2).
Then, as in Theorem 1, an h-type strictly prefers to tell the truth whenever an `-type
seller weakly prefers to do so, which is the case when q = g or when q = b and µ ∈ [0, µ¯].
For the cases that q = b and µ > µ¯, it suffices to establish that an h-type seller prefers to
tell the truth when µ = 1, which amounts to showing that 1 + δV˜ ∗h (0) ≤ δh/(1− δ). From
V˜ ∗h (0) = h`+ δhV˜
∗
h (0) + δ(1− h)V ∗h (p˜i∗Bb(0))
and V ∗h (µ) ≤ h/(1− δ) for all µ, we obtain
1 + δV˜ ∗h (0) ≤ 1 + δ
h`+ δ(1− h)h/(1− δ)
1− δh = 1 +
δh
1− δ −
δh(1− `)
1− δh
which is less than δh/(1− δ) if δh(2− `) > 1. As (1) implies that h(2− `) > 1, the desired
condition is satisfied if δ < 1 is sufficiently close to 1.
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1 Proof of Theorem 2
Recall that we augment our baseline model as follows:
a) In every period, the seller receives a signal qˆt ∈ {g, b} such that Pr (qˆt = g | qt = g) =
1 > Pr (qˆt = b | qt = b) = α where α is close to 1.
b) In every period, the seller is replaced by another seller of the other type with a small,
exogenous probability 1− β, where β < 1 is close to 1.
The replacement is not observed by potential buyers. We define δ as the seller’s discount
factor adjusted for survival, i.e., the discount factor multiplied by the survival rate β.
We fix β and δ close to 1 (this will be made precise below) and show that an honest
equilibrium exists for sufficiently large α. Under our assumption that the seller knows for
sure that quality is bad when the signal is bad, an `-type seller would never report a good
signal as bad because this would reveal his type without short-term gain, but may report
a bad signal as good, say with probability y. The equilibrium conditions for `-type are the
same as for β = α = 1 but with different formulae for the equilibrium price and transition
functions for the market’s update of reputation. In what follows, for conciseness we will
use “hat” to denote functions that are evaluated for β and α different from 1. Then, the
prices for B and G are pˆ∗B(µ) = 0 and pˆ
∗
G(µ) = pˆG(µ, y
∗(µ)) where:3
pˆG(µ, y) =
µh+ (1− µ)`
µ(h+ (1− h)(1− α)) + (1− µ)(`+ (1− `)(1− α + αy)) .
The transition functions are pˆi∗Gg(µ), pˆi
∗
Bb(µ) = pˆiBb(µ, y
∗(µ)) and pˆi∗Gb(µ) = pˆiGb(µ, y
∗(µ))
where
pˆi∗Gg(µ) = (2β − 1)
µh
µh+ (1− µ)` + 1− β
pˆiBb(µ, y) = (2β − 1) µ(1− h)
µ(1− h) + (1− µ)(1− `)(1− y) + 1− β
pˆiGb(µ, y) = (2β − 1) µ(1− h)(1− α)
µ(1− h)(1− α) + (1− µ)(1− `)(1− α + αy) + 1− β
These price and transition functions increase in µ. Raising y increases pˆG and pˆiBb but
decreases pˆiGb. The key difference from the baseline model is that when α < 1, pˆiGb is
positive, increases in µ and decreases in y. Note that pˆiGb and its derivatives converge to 0
when α tends to 1. More precisely, there exists ρ > 0 such that for all α and µ ∈ [1− β, β],
∂pˆiGb(µ,y)
∂µ
= (2β−1)(1−`)(1−α+αy)(1−h)(1−α)
[µ(1−h)(1−α)+(1−µ)(1−`)(1−α+αy)]2 < ρ(1− α)∣∣∣∂pˆiGb(µ,y)∂y ∣∣∣ = (2β−1)µ(1−µ)(1−`)α(1−h)(1−α)[µ(1−h)(1−α)+(1−µ)(1−`)(1−α+αy)]2 < ρ(1− α). (9)
This will imply that a small observation error has a small effect on the strategy of an
`-type seller.
3In an alternative case that the seller observes the quality perfectly but the buyers mis-report good
quality as bad with probability 1− α, the analysis is the same except that the price is pG(µ, y).
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To prove Theorem 2, we show first that an `-type seller’s strategy and value function
exist that satisfy incentive compatibility when α and β are large enough (Section 1.1),
then show that these functions converge as α and β tend to 1 (Section 1.2), which is used
to verify the incentive compatibility of an h-type seller (Section 1.3).
1.1 Existence of the value function and equilibrium strategy for
`-type
We first establish the existence of a value function V βα` and a positive policy function y
βα,
defined for µ ∈ [1 − β, β], that characterize the equilibrium value function and strategy
for an `-type seller. We will not claim they are unique but only that they are close to the
unique equilibrium of Theorem 1 when β and α are large. In this part, as β and α are
fixed (close to 1), we drop the superscript βα.
For a given β < 1 close to 1, fix κ ∈ R+ large enough so that
κ >
1
1− δ
(1− `
h
+
1− `
h
1
β(1− β)
)
, (10)
and define Fβ as the set of all non-decreasing κ-Lipschitz functions V : [1 − β, β] →
[ `
1−δ ,
1
1−δ ] such that V (β) − V (1 − β) ≤ 1. In this section we prove that for large enough
α, there exists an equilibrium with a value function for an `-type seller in Fβ.
Define yV in the same manner as in the proof of Theorem 1:
yV (µ) = 1 if pˆG(µ, 1) ≥ δ(V (β)− V (pˆiGb(µ, 1))) (11)
pˆG(µ, yV (µ)) = δ(V (pˆiBb(µ, yV (µ)))− V (pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ)))), otherwise. (12)
Notice that the left-hand side (LHS) of (12) is decreasing in y while the RHS is non-
decreasing in y. Let y > 0 be such that pˆG(0, y)
∣∣
α=1
= `
`+(1−`)y > δ ≥ δ(V (β)− V (1− β))
and µˇ be close enough to 1 so that pˆG(µˇ, 1)
∣∣
α=1
> δ. Then, if α and β are large enough,
pˆG(µ, y) > δ for all µ and pˆG(µ, 1) > δ for µ > µˇ and thus, yV (µ) is well-defined and
exceeds y for all µ ∈ [1 − β, β] and is equal to 1 if µ ≥ µˇ. Moreover, as pˆG(µ, 1) and
pˆiGb(µ, 1) increase in µ while pˆiBb(µ, 1) = β, for any V there exists µ¯V < µˇ such that
yV (µ) = 1 ⇔ µ ≥ µ¯V . Therefore, there are αmin, βmin ∈ (0, 1) such that if α ∈ (αmin, 1)
and β ∈ (βmin, 1) then for any V ∈ Fβ,
yV (µ) ≥ y for all µ ∈ [1− β, β] and yV (µ) = 1⇔ µ ∈ [µ¯V , β] for some µ¯V < β. (13)
Below we only consider α ∈ (αmin, 1) and β ∈ (βmin, 1) so that (13) holds. From the same
argument as in the perfect signal case, as pˆG(µ, y) and δ(V (pˆiGb(µ, y))− V (pˆiBb(µ, y))) are
continuous, yV is continuous. In addition, we have
Lemma 1 For all V ∈ Fβ, the function yV is K-Lipschitz, where K is independent of α.
Proof. As {
∂pˆG(µ,y)
∂µ
= h(1−`)(1−α+αy)−`(1−h)(1−α)
(µ(h+(1−h)(1−α))+(1−µ)(`+(1−`)(1−α+αy)))2
∂pˆG(µ,y)
∂y
= − (µh+(1−µ)`)(1−µ)(1−`)α
(µ(h+(1−h)(1−α))+(1−µ)(`+(1−`)(1−α+αy)))2
(14)
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and
{
∂pˆiBb(µ,y)
∂µ
= (2β−1)(1−h)(1−y)(1−`)
[µ(1−h)+(1−µ)(1−`)(1−y)]2
∂pˆiBb(µ,y)
∂y
= (2β−1)µ(1−h)(1−µ)(1−`)
[µ(1−h)+(1−µ)(1−`)(1−y)]2 ,
(15)
one can find positive numbers k0 and k1 such that for µ ∈ [1− β, β] and y ∈
[
y, 1
]
:
k0 <
∂pˆG(µ, y)
∂µ
,
∂pˆiBb(µ, y)
∂y
,−∂pˆG(µ, y)
∂y
< k1; 0 <
∂pˆiBb(µ, y)
∂µ
< k1; ρ(1− αmin) < k1.
(16)
Hence, H(µ, y) = pˆG(µ, y) + δ(V (pˆiGb(µ, y))−V (pˆiBb(µ, y))) is k-Lipschitz in both com-
ponents, where k = k1 + 2κk1. Consider µ, µ′ ∈ (1 − β, µ¯V ) so that yV (µ) < 1 and
yV (µ
′) < 1. Then, H(µ, yV (µ)) = H(µ′, yV (µ′)) by (12), which implies
H(µ, yV (µ))−H(µ′, yV (µ)) = H(µ′, yV (µ′))−H(µ′, yV (µ))
and consequently,
k |µ− µ′| ≥ |H(µ′, yV (µ′))−H(µ′, yV (µ))| .
As H is absolutely continuous and ∂
∂y
H(µ, y) ≤ ∂pˆG(µ,y)
∂y
< −k0 < 0 where the first inequal-
ity follows from ∂pˆiGb(µ,y)
∂y
< 0 and ∂pˆiBb(µ,y)
∂y
> 0,
k |µ− µ′| ≥ |H(µ′, yV (µ′))−H(µ′, yV (µ))| > k0 |yV (µ′)− yV (µ)| .
Hence, yV is K-Lipschitz on (1−β, µ¯V ) where K = k/k0. As yV (µ) = 1 for all µ ∈ [µ¯V , β],
it is K-Lipschitz on the entire domain.
We now define an operator T on the set Fβ as
TV (µ) = pˆG(µ, yV (µ)) + δ(`V (pˆiGg(µ)) + (1− `)V (pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ)))). (17)
Lemma 2 There are α¯ < 1 and κ > 0 such that if α > α¯ then for all V ∈ Fβ and
µ ∈ [1− β, β], (i) ` ≤ (1 − δ)TV (µ) ≤ 1, (ii) TV (β) − TV (1 − β) < 1, (iii) TV is
κ-Lipschitz, and (iv) TV ′(µ) > −κ(1− α) for a.e. µ. In addition, (v) T is continuous on
Fβ.
Proof. (i) That `/(1− δ) ≤ TV ≤ 1/(1− δ) obtains because `/(1− δ) ≤ V (µ) ≤ 1/(1− δ)
and ` ≤ pˆG(µ, y) ≤ 1.
(ii) Using yV (β) = 1, we have
TV (β) = 1 + δ(`V (β) + (1− `)V (pˆiGb(β, 1))) and
TV (1− β) ≥ `+ δV (1− β).
For α large, we have (using the fact that V is κ-Lipschitz):
TV (β)− TV (1− β) ≤ 1− `+ δ`(V (β)− V (1− β)) + δ(1− `)(V (pˆiGb(β, 1))− V (1− β))
≤ 1− `+ δ`+ δ(1− `)κ(pˆiGb(β, 1)− (1− β))
= 1− `+ δ`+ δ(1− `)κ(2β − 1) β(1− h)(1− α)
β(1− h)(1− α) + (1− β)(1− `)
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where the equality follows from writing out pˆiGb(β, 1). Hence, TV (β)− TV (1− β) < 1 for
large enough α as −`+ δ` < 0.
(iii) We first show that pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ)) is increasing in µ. This is straightforward from
∂pˆiGb(µ,y)
∂µ
when yV (µ) = 1. When yV (µ) < 1, we have pˆG(µ, yV (µ)) + δV (pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ))) =
δV (piBb(µ, yV (µ))) from (12). The value of this equality is non-decreasing in µ, because if
it were decreasing then yV (µ) would have to increase for the LHS to decrease as µ increases
while yV (µ) would have to decrease for the RHS to decrease. Note that
∂pˆiGb(µ,y)
∂µ
−∂pˆiGb(µ,y)
∂y
=
1− α + αy
µ(1− µ)α >
∂pˆG(µ,y)
∂µ
−∂pˆG(µ,y)
∂y
=
h(1− `)(1− α + αy)− `(1− h)(1− α)
(µh+ (1− µ)`)(1− µ)(1− `)α > 0.
If piGb(µ, yV (µ)) were non-increasing, then yV would be increasing and the above inequality
implies that pˆG(µ, yV (µ)) would be decreasing. But this would imply that pˆG(µ, yV (µ)) +
δV (pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ))) is decreasing, a contradiction to the assertion above. Hence, we conclude
that piGb(µ, yV (µ)) is increasing in µ.
We now show that TV is κ-Lipschitz. As the function yV , pˆG, pˆiBb, pˆiGb, TV are
Lipschitz, they are absolutely continuous and we can apply the rule of composition for
derivatives. From (17) we get
TV ′(µ) =
∂pˆG(µ, yV (µ))
∂µ
+
∂pˆG(µ, yV (µ))
∂y
dyV (µ)
dµ
+ δ
[
`V ′(pˆiGg(µ))
dpˆiGg(µ)
dµ
+(1− `)V ′(pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ)))
(∂pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ))
∂µ
+
∂pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ))
∂y
dyV (µ)
dµ
)]
.(18)
Notice that
(2β − 1)h`
(βh+ (1− β)`)2 <
dpˆiGg(µ)
dµ
=
(2β − 1)h`
(µh+ (1− µ)`)2 <
`
h
< 1. (19)
Using, in addition, the fact that pˆiGg(µ) and pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ)) increase in µ, we obtain (from
now on we omit the arguments for partial derivatives):
TV ′(µ) ≤ ∂pˆG
∂µ
+
∂pˆG
∂y
dyV (µ)
dµ
+ δκ + δ(1− `)κ
(∂pˆiGb
∂µ
+
∂pˆiGb
∂y
dyV (µ)
dµ
)
. (20)
Recall that ∂pˆG
∂y
and ∂pˆiGb
∂y
are negative. Moreover,
∂pˆG(µ, y)
∂µ
<
h(1− `)
(µh+ (1− µ)`)2 <
1− `
h
and
∣∣∣∣∂pˆG∂y
∣∣∣∣ < 1− `h . (21)
We consider two cases as below.
a) Suppose that dyV (µ)
dµ
< 0. Then, the LHS of (12) increases in µ, which implies that
pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ)) increases and thus,
dyV (µ)
dµ
> −∂piBb
∂µ
/∂piBb
∂y
= −1− yV (µ)
µ(1− µ) > −
1
β(1− β) .
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Thus, for α large enough, using (9) and (21) we obtain from (20) that
TV ′(µ) <
1− `
h
+
1− `
h
1
β(1− β) + δκ + δ(1− `)κ
(
1 +
1
β(1− β)
)
ρ(1− α) < κ
and that
TV ′(µ) >
dpˆG(µ, yV (µ))
dµ
> 0.
b) Suppose that dyV (µ)
dµ
≥ 0. Then, from (20) we have
TV ′(µ) <
1− `
h
+ δκ + δ(1− `)κρ(1− α) < κ
for large enough α. Moreover, as pˆG(µ, yV (µ)) and V (pˆiGg(µ)) increase in µ, for large
enough α we obtain from (18) that
TV ′(µ) ≥ δ(1− `)κ∂pˆiGb
∂y
dyV
dµ
> −δ(1− `)κρ(1− α)K > −κ. (22)
(iv) As TV ′(µ) > 0 has been shown when dyV (µ)
dµ
< 0 above, TV ′(µ) > −κ(1 − α) by
(22) whenever TV ′(µ) is defined if we set κ = δ(1− `)κρK.
(v) The proof is omitted. It is the same as in the case α = β = 1, except that V
is continuous which simplifies the proof. Notice that the image of Fβ is also a set of
κ-Lipschitz function. Thus, the topology of pointwise convergence is the same as the
topology of uniform convergence.
Lemma 2 shows that T preserves all properties of V except for monotonicity. Hence,
we define T˜ : Fβ → Fβ as
T˜ V (µ) = max
m∈[1−β,µ]
TV (m)
and show in the next two lemmas that T˜ has a fixed point and that it is a fixed point of
T as well.
Lemma 3 There exists a fixed point V βα` of T˜ .
Proof. As Fβ is a compact set by Ascoli-Arzela` Theorem,4 it suffices to show that T˜
is continuous. Suppose that Vn converges to V , where convergence is uniform. Sup-
pose that T˜ Vn(µ) converges to z > T˜V (µ). Then there exists a sequence µn < µ such
that TVn(µn) converges to z. Assume without loss of generality that µn converges to
µˆ ≤ µ. Since TVn is κ-Lipschitz and TVn converges to TV, it must be the case that
limn→+∞ T˜ Vn(µ) = TV (µˆ). Hence TV (µˆ) = z > T˜V (µ), a contradiction with µˆ ≤ µ. Sup-
pose that T˜ Vn(µ) converges to z < T˜V (µ), then there is some µˆ ≤ µ such that TV (µˆ) > z.
But then TVn(µˆ) converges to TV (µˆ) so that limn→+∞ T˜ Vn(µ) ≥ TV (µˆ) > z, a contradic-
tion. Hence, it must be the case that T˜ Vn(µ) converges to T˜ V (µ) for all µ.
4See Royden H.L.(1988), Real Analysis, 3rd ed., Macmillan Publishing Company, New York.
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Lemma 4 For α sufficiently close to 1, if V is a fixed point of T˜ , then V is a fixed point
of T , i.e., V is increasing.
Proof. Recall from (13) that if α and β are sufficiently close to 1, then yV (µ) ≥ y and
yV (µ) = 1 if µ ≥ µ¯V . Moreover, the reasoning for (13) has shown that µ¯V is uniformly
bounded above by µˇ. For the proof we will need to bound some slopes. For any given
c > 0, one can set η > 0 small enough so that
µˇη < (β − µˇ)c/2. (23)
Then Lemma 2, properties (9) and (16) and the definition (18) imply that there exist
ξ > 0 and c > 0 such that if we choose α0 ≥ α so that κ(1 − α0) < η, then the following
holds:
For α > α0 and µ ∈ [1− β, β] , TV ′(µ) > −η and TV ′(µ) > c if dyV (µ)
dµ
< ξ. (24)
To prove the lemma, suppose V is a fixed point of T˜ for α > α0.
First, note from (24) that TV ′(µ) > c for all µ ≥ µˇ so that TV (β) > TV (µˇ)+(β− µˇ)c.
Together with (23), this further implies that
max
m∈[1−β,µˇ]
TV (m) < TV (µˇ) + µˇη < TV (µˇ) + (β − µˇ)c/2 < TV (β)− (β − µˇ)c/2.
Then, by choosing µ† ∈ (µˇ, β) such that κ(β − µ†) < (β − µˇ)c/2, we have TV (µ) >
maxm∈[1−β,µˇ] TV (m) for µ ≥ µ† and thus TV (µ) = maxm∈[µˇ,µ] TV (m) by (24). Hence,
T˜ V (µ) = TV (µ) = V (µ) and T˜ V ′(µ) = TV ′(µ) = V ′(µ) > c for all µ ≥ µ†. (25)
Notice that µ† is independent of α > α0. For each α > α0, define
µ◦(α) = sup{µ|T˜ V (µ) 6= TV (µ)} ≤ µ†
if T˜ V (µ) 6= TV (µ) for some µ ∈ [1− β, β], and let µ◦(α) = 1− β otherwise. Observe from
(19) that, independently of α, there exist  > 0 and ν > 0 such that
For µ ∈ [1− β, µ†], pˆiGg(µ) > µ+  and dpˆiGg(µ)
dµ
> ν. (26)
We assume ν < 1 without loss of generality. From this we establish the following:
Claim There exist finite sequences cn > 0 and αn < 1 for n = 1, · · · , N , with µ† −N <
1 − β, such that if α > αn and µ† − (n − 1) > µ◦(α), then T˜ V ′(µ) = TV ′(µ) =
V ′(µ) ≥ cn for all µ ∈ [max{µ† − n, µ◦(α)}, β].
Proof of Claim: We proceed by induction. The property holds for n = 1 with c1 = c.
Suppose that it holds for n− 1 and ck is non-increasing in k ≤ n− 1.
Consider α ∈ (αn−1, 1) such that µ† − (n− 1) > µ◦(α). If such α does not exist, then
the property of the Claim holds trivially for n by setting cn = cn−1 and αn = αn−1. Hence,
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suppose such α exists. Then T˜ V ′(µ) = TV ′(µ) = V ′(µ) ≥ cn−1 if µ ≥ µ† − (n − 1) by
induction hypothesis.
Define In = [max{µ† − n, µ◦(α)}, µ† − (n − 1)]. For µ ∈ In, we have TV ′(µ) > c if
dyV (µ)
dµ
< ξ from (24). Suppose now that dyV (µ)
dµ
≥ ξ, then condition (12) implies that
dpˆG(µ, yV (µ))
dµ
+ δV ′(pˆiGb(µ, yV (µ)))
(∂pˆiGb
∂µ
+
∂pˆiGb
∂y
dyV (µ)
dµ
)
= δV ′(pˆiBb(µ, yV (µ)))
(∂pˆiBb
∂µ
+
∂pˆiBb
∂y
dyV (µ)
dµ
)
≥ 0. (27)
Moreover, for µ ∈ In, pˆiGg(µ) ≥ µ† − (n − 1) implies that V ′(pˆiGg(µ)) ≥ cn−1. These
properties imply from (18) that
TV ′(µ) ≥ `dpˆG(µ, yV (µ))
dµ
+ δ`V ′(pˆiGg(µ))
dpˆiGg(µ)
dµ
≥ `dpˆG(µ, yV (µ))
dµ
+ δ`cn−1ν. (28)
If the second term of the LHS of (27) is negative then dpˆG(µ,yV (µ))
dµ
is positive and
TV ′(µ) ≥ δ`cn−1ν by (28).
Consider the alternative case that the second term of the LHS of (27) is positive. Then,
from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can choose αn ≥ αn−1, so as to ensure that for α ≥ αn the
second term of the LHS of (27) is less than δcn−1ν/2. Thereby,
dpˆG
dµ
≥ −δcn−1ν/2 so that
TV ′(µ) ≥ −δ`cn−1ν/2 + δ`cn−1ν = δ`cn−1ν/2 by (28).
Thus, we have shown that the property of the Claim holds for αn and cn = δ`cn−1ν/2,
completing the induction argument. 
The Claim above establishes that there is α∗ < 1 and c∗ > 0 such that:
T˜ V ′(µ) = TV ′(µ) = V ′(µ) ≥ c∗ for all µ ∈ [µ◦(α), β] if α > α∗. (29)
To prove the lemma, it remains to show that µ◦(α) = 1− β for sufficiently large α. To do
this, for α > α∗ such that µ◦(α) > 1 − β, by applying the induction step in the proof of
the Claim one more time on J = [µ◦(α)− , µ◦(α)]∩ [1−β, β], we deduce that there exists
α∗∗ < 1 such that (notice that we cannot claim T˜ V ′(µ) = TV ′(µ) on J):
TV ′(µ) ≥ δ`c∗ν/2 for all µ ∈ J = [µ◦(α)− , µ◦(α)] ∩ [1− β, β] if α > α∗∗. (30)
The last step is to show that µ◦(α)− ≤ 1−β for α large. Suppose that µ◦(α)− > 1−β
for some α > α∗∗. One can choose α∗∗∗ ≥ α∗∗ such that κ(1 − α∗∗∗) < δ`c∗ν/4. For
α > α∗∗∗, as TV ′(µ) > −δ`c∗ν/4 from Lemma 2, we have for any µ < µ◦(α)− ,
TV (µ) < TV (µ◦(α)− ) + δ`c∗ν/4(µ◦(α)− − µ) < TV (µ◦(α))− δ`c∗ν/4. (31)
In conjunction with (30), this means that there is µ′ < µ◦(α) such that TV ′(µ) > 0 if
µ ≥ µ′ and TV (µ) < TV (µ′) if µ < µ′, which would contradict the definition of µ◦(α).
Thus, we conclude that µ◦(α)−  ≤ 1− β for all α > α∗∗∗. Then for α > α∗∗∗, properties
(29) and (30) imply that TV is increasing on [1− β, β] and thus that µ◦(α) = 1− β.
In conjunction with (29), this proves that V ′(µ) > 0 for all µ if V is a fixed point of T˜
when α > α∗∗∗. Hence, V = TV.
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1.2 Continuity of V βαθ in β and α
Recall that given β, a fixed point of T and the corresponding policy function, V βα` and y
βα,
are Lipschitz with uniformly bounded Lipschitz constant for α close to 1. For a fixed value
of β, consider a sequence αk that converges to 1. As the set Fβ is compact, we can assume
without loss of generality that the value function V βαk` converges uniformly as k →∞. Let
V β` denote this limit. Define y
β as the solution of equations (11) and (12) for V β` , which is
unique. It must be the case that yβαk converges to yβ. We thus conclude that the limits
V β` and y
β correspond to a fixed point and policy function pair (V β1` , y
β1) for β and α = 1.
Now consider a sequence βn that converges to 1. Again as the set of increasing Lipschitz
functions is compact we can assume without loss of generality that V βn` (µ) converges to
a limit denoted by V ∞` (µ) for all µ ∈ (0, 1). Define V ∞` (0) = limn→∞ V βn` (1 − βn) and
V ∞` (1) = limn→∞ V
βn
` (βn). By continuity we have (here superscript n of pˆ
n
G and pˆi
n
Gg means
evaluated at βn and α = 1)
yβn(µ) = 1 for µ > µ¯n
pˆnG(µ, y
βn(µ)) = δ(V βn` (pˆi
n
Bb(µ, y
βn(µ)))− V βn` (1− βn)) for µ ≤ µ¯n, and
V βn` (µ) = pˆ
n
G(µ, y
βn(µ)) + δ(`V βn` (pˆi
n
Gg(µ)) + (1− `)V βn` (1− βn))
where µ¯n is µ¯V of (13) obtained for the given βn and α = 1 relative to V = V
βn
` .
We now show that the limit is an equilibrium.
i) For any µ ∈ (0, 1), let y∞ be the unique solution to equations (11) and (12) evaluated
at β = α = 1. Recall that µˇ is independent of β and µˇ > µ¯n. For µ > µˇ, we have
V βn` (µ) =
∑∞
t=0(δ`)
tpˆnG(pˆi
n
Gg(µ)
t, 1) + φn where pˆi
n
Gg(µ)
t is the t-iteration of pˆinGg(µ), and φn
is a constant. Given that pˆinGg(·) and pˆnG have uniformly bounded slopes on [µˇ, 1], it follows
that V βn has a uniformly bounded slope on µ > µˇ. The same argument as in Lemma 2
(of this Appendix) shows that for any µ0 > 1 − βn arbitrarily close to 1 − βn, the slope
of V βn` is uniformly bounded on [µ0, βn] (by choosing κ >
1
1−δ (
1−`
h
+ 1−`
h
1
µ0(1−µ0)) one can
ensure that the bound of the slope on (µ0, µˇ] is independent of βn). This implies that for
any µ ∈ (0, 1), yβn(µ) converges to y∞(µ) and
V ∞` (µ) = pG(µ, y
∞(µ)) + δ(`V ∞` (piGg(µ)) + (1− `)V ∞` (0)).
ii) Moreover
V ∞` (1) = lim
n→∞
{
pˆnG(βn, 1) + δ(`V
βn
` (pˆi
n
Gg(µ)) + (1− `)V βn` (1− βn))
}
= pG(1, 1) + δ(`V
∞
` (1) + (1− `)V ∞` (0))
iii) To conclude we show that V ∞` (0) = `/1− δ. By continuity of V ∞` , we have
V ∞` (0) = lim
µ→0
{pG(µ, y∞(µ)) + δ(`V ∞` (piGg(µ)) + (1− `)V ∞` (0))} .
Also, by continuity of V ∞` , limµ→0 δ(V
∞
` (piBb(µ, y))−V ∞` (0)) = 0 for y < 1. Hence, y∞(µ)
converges to 1 when µ goes to zero, which implies that the V ∞` (0) = `+ δV
∞
` (0) = `/1− δ.
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We thus conclude from i), ii) and iii) that the limit (V ∞, y∞) is the unique equilibrium
(V ∗` , y
∗) for β = α = 1 characterized in Proposition 1 of this Appendix.
To show uniform convergence, we extend V βn` on [0, 1] by postulating V
βn
` (µ) = V
βn
` (1−
βn) for µ < 1−βn and V βn` (µ) = V βn` (βn) for µ > βn. Then V βn` (µ) converges to V ∗` (µ) for
all µ ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that V βn` is increasing while the limit V ∗` is continuous on [0, 1].
According to Polya’s Theorem5 this implies that the extension of V βn` to [0, 1] converges
uniformly to V ∗` . Excluding 0 and 1 as they are not in the support [1− βn, βn], we obtain
uniform convergence of V βn` to V
∗
` on (0, 1).
In the proof of Theorem 3 (Claim 2 of Lemma 8 of this Appendix), we show V ∗` to be
Lipschitz-continuous on any interval [µ0, 1] with µ0 > 0. From the argument of Lemma 1
of this Appendix, y∗ is also Lipschitz-continuous on [µ0, 1].
By the same argument, we can show that the value function V βnh converges to V
∗
h ,
uniformly on (0, 1) (again convergence follows because all the functions involved are Lips-
chitz and converge on any interval [µ0, 1], with uniformly bounded Lipschitz constant, and
uniform convergence follows from Polya’s Theorem).
1.3 Incentive compatibility for h-type
Consider first β < 1 and α = 1 and let yβ be the equilibrium policy. Let V βh denote the
value function of an h-type seller who truthfully announces the signal received.
Lemma 5 Suppose that (1) holds and δ is large. For β sufficiently close to 1, pˆG(µ, y
β(µ)) <
δ(V βh (pˆiBb(µ, y
β(µ)))− V βh (1− β)) for all µ ∈ [1− β, β]
Proof. Suppose this is not the case. Then we can find sequences βn < 1 and µn ∈
[1− βn, βn] such that (where the superscript n means evaluated at βn)
pˆnG(µn, y
βn(µn)) ≥ δ(V βnh (pˆinBb(µn, yβn(µn)))− V βnh (1− βn)) (32)
where βn → 1. Assume without loss of generality that µn and yβn(µn) converge and let
µ∞ and y∗(µ∞) denote their respective limits.
Recalling that the value function V βnh converges to V
∗
h uniformly on (0, 1), we focus on
the equilibrium of the game when β = α = 1 where the value function V˜ ∗h of the h-type
is continuous at µ = 0, that we derived in Proposition 1 of this Appendix when (1) holds
and δ is large. Recall that V˜ ∗h (0) = infµ>0 V
∗
h (µ) and p˜i
∗
Bb (0) = limµ→0 pi
∗
Bb (µ).
Notice that limn→∞ V
βn
h (1−βn) ≤ V ∗h (µ) for any µ > 0, implying that limn→∞ V βnh (1−
βn) ≤ V˜ ∗h (0). Thus, taking the limit of condition (32) we obtain (notice that this hold even
if µ∞ = 0 because pˆinBb(µn, y
βn(µn)) converges to p˜i
∗
Bb(0) > 0)
pG(µ∞, y∗(µ∞)) ≥ δ(V ∗h (piBb(µ∞, y∗(µ∞)))− V˜ ∗h (0)),
which contradicts the fact the h-type strictly prefers to announce truthfully for all µ ∈ [0, 1]
as shown in the proof of Proposition 1 of this Appendix. This proves the lemma.
Finally, we have
5See R. Rao (1962), “Relations between Weak and Uniform Convergence of Measures with Applica-
tions,” The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 659-680.
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Lemma 6 Suppose that (1) holds and δ is large. For β close to 1, the incentive constraint
of an h-type seller is satisfied for all µ ∈ [1− β, β] when α is close to 1.
Proof. Fix β sufficiently large so that Lemma 5 holds. To reach a contradiction, suppose
that the conclusion of this lemma fails. Then, we can find a sequence αn converging to 1
such that for each fixed point V βαn` with policy function y
βαn , there exists µn where the
incentive constraint of the h-type is violated. One can ensure δ is large enough so that for
any µ ∈ [0, β] if yβαn(µ) = 1 then an h-type seller strictly prefers to tell the truth when the
signal is bad because the long-term loss would exceed the maximum possible short-term
gain, 1, if n is large enough. Then, it must be the case that yβαn(µn) < 1 for large enough
n. By an argument analogous to before, the value function V βαnh converges uniformly to
V βh on [1 − β, β] (again this follows because all the functions involved are Lipschitz with
uniformly bounded Lipschitz constant). Thus, at the limit the incentive constraint of the
h-type must hold with equality at any limit value of µn, which would contradict Lemma
5.
Lemmas 3, 4, 5 and 6 (in this Appendix) imply Theorem 2.
2 Negative social value
We establish here that an honest equilibrium exist when sellers incur a small distribution
cost c < `. The equilibrium has the following features:
i) An h-type seller announces the quality truthfully and doesn’t sell when quality is
bad.
ii) An `-type seller announces truthfully when q = g but lies when q = b with probability
y and sells.
The characterization of the `-type seller strategy and value function is the same as in
the baseline model except that pG (µ, y) has to be replaced by pG (µ, y) − c. At µ = 0,
`-type seller “babbles” and sell at a price equal to `− c.
The proof that an h-type seller always announces bad quality truthfully is the same as
before if
δ > δch =
1− c
1 + h (1− c)− `.
However, we need to ensure that an h-type seller does not lie when q = g to boost
reputation. As the reputation monotonically increases from an initial level µ1 for h-type
seller, it suffices to show that
p∗G(µ)− c+ δV ∗h (pi∗Gg(µ)) ≥ δV ∗h (pi∗Bb(µ)) for all µ ≥ µ1.
As V ∗h (pi
∗
Gg(µ)) converges to V
∗
h (1) when µ tends to 1 by continuity, this inequality holds
for large enough µ because as µ→ 1,
p∗G(µ)− c → h− c > δ
(
V ∗h (1)− V ∗h (pi∗Gg(µ))
) ≥ δ(V ∗h (pi∗Bb(µ))− V ∗h (pi∗Gg(µ))).
Therefore, an honest equilibrium exists if µ1 is large enough.
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3 Proof of Theorem 3
To prove the existence of an honest equilibrium in the model where sellers can start afresh
with a new identity, we proceed in two steps. First, we characterise the equilibrium of an
instrumental “auxiliary model” in which a newborn seller with initial reputation µ ∈ [0, 1]
must trade in the platform in the first period but may exit in any future period for an
exogenous outside option value v1 ∈ ( `1−δ , 11−δ ). Then, by incorporating equilibrium restart
decisions into this analysis, we establish the existence of a stationary equilibrium of the
model with an option to restart, where v1 is endogenously determined as the value of an
`-type seller deciding to restart.
First, we show that the auxiliary model described above has an equilibrium. It is worth
pointing out that this result is of independent interest to the extent that in the proof of
Theorem 3 we only exploit the existence of an incentive compatible value function of the
auxiliary model and the optimality of the h-type seller strategy is obtained differently.
Lemma 7 In the auxiliary model with an exit value v1 ∈ ( `1−δ , 11−δ ), an honest equilibrium
exists if δ( h
1−δ − v1) > 1. All honest equilibria coincide on the equilibrium path.
Proof. It is straightforwardly verified that an `-type seller truthfully announces when q = g
by the same argument as before. Thus, as in the baseline model, an equilibrium strategy
is described by the probability of lying by an `-type seller upon drawing q = b, denoted by
y†(µ) to distinguish it from that in Section 4 of the main article. Let V †v1 denote the value
function of an `-type seller in an honest equilibrium (presuming one exists). Adopting the
convention, for the same reason as before, that an `-seller always announce G when µ = 0,
we have V †v1(0) = p
∗
G(0) + δmax{v1, V †v1(0)} = ` + δv1 > `1−δ ; and, analogously to (25) of
the main article, V †v1(µ) > V
†
v1
(0) is immediate for all µ > 0. In addition, an argument
analogous to that leading to (13) in the main article, establishes that without loss of
generality we may set pi†Gb(1) = 0. Then, the boundary values are routinely computed to
be
V †v1(0) = `+ δv1 ∈ (
`
1− δ , v1) and V
†
v1
(1) = v1 + ∆v1 > V
∗
` (1) (33)
where ∆v1 :=
1− (1− δ)v1
(1− δ`) < ∆ < 1 .
Moreover, the relevant steps in the proof for Lemma 2 of the main article, extend straight-
forwardly to verify that V †v1 is continuous and strictly increasing in µ.
Define F¯v1 to be the set of all non-decreasing and right-continuous functions V on
[0, 1] such that V (0) = V †v1(0) and V (1) = V
†
v1
(1). Define y†V (µ) in the same manner
as in (41) and (42) of the main article, with V (0) replaced by v1 and µ¯ replaced by
µ¯† := min{µ | pG(µ, 1) ≥ δ∆v1} < µ¯ where the last inequality follows from ∆v1 < ∆. As
long as δ∆v1 > ` so that y
†
V (µ) < 1 for some µ, which we assume below (else, y
†
V (µ) ≡ 1
and the proof is simpler), we have y†V (µ) ∈ (0, 1) for µ ∈ (0, µ¯†) with limµ→0 y†V (µ) = 1
because δ
(
max{V (piBb(µ, y)), v1} − v1
)
approaches δ∆v1> ` as y → 1 while it approaches
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0 as µ → 0 for all y < 1.6 Furthermore, y†V (µ) is clearly continuous and equal to 1 for
µ ≥ µ¯†. Define Tv1 : F¯v1 → F¯v1 as
Tv1(V )(µ) := pG(µ, y
†
V (µ)) + δ(`max{v1, V (pi∗Gg(µ))}+ (1− `)v1). (34)
It is straightforward to verify that Tv1(V ) ∈ F¯v1 .
Then, the proof for Proposition 1 of Section 4.2 (of the main article) extend to Tv1 ,
establishing that, for any v1 ∈ ( `1−δ , 11−δ ), there is a unique fixed point of Tv1 and it is
continuous and strictly increasing. We omit the proofs because they are analogous with
straightforward changes due to the seller opting to exit whenever his reputation level is so
low that the continuation value falls short of v1.
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Since the outside option value is v1 for an h-type seller as well, optimality of truth-telling
for h-type seller can be verified by an argument analogous to that leading to Theorem 1,
with δh replaced by the threshold δv1 that solves
δv1
( h
1− δv1
− v1
)
= 1.
Thus, we have shown that an honest equilibrium exists if δ( h
1−δ − v1) > 1, when sellers can
exit for an outside option value v1.
3.1 Existence of an honest equilibrium with restart
Recall that µ1 and χ1 denote the default reputation level and stationary mass of new
sellers, respectively; and v1 denotes `-seller’s default value. In equilibrium, an `-seller’s
strategy y†v1 and value function and V
†
v1
are given by Lemma 7 above.
Let ρθ(q) denote the probability that a seller of type θ draws q ∈ {g, b}, i.e., ρθ(g) = θ =
1 − ρθ(b). For any k-period quality history hk = (q1, · · · , qk) ∈ Hk := {g, b}k, let ρθ(hk)
be the ex-ante probability that hk realises for a seller of type θ. We use hkj = (q1, · · · , qj)
to denote the first j-entry truncation of hk.
Given a default reputation µ1 > 0, let pi(h
k
j ) denote the posterior reputation for a
seller who has survived the history hkj without cheating, updated according to y
†
v1
. Setting
pi(hk0) = µ1, we can define pi(h
k
j ) recursively by:
pi(hkj ) =
pi(hkj−1)ρh(qj)
pi(hkj−1)ρh(qj) + (1− pi(hkj−1))ρ`(qj)(1− y†v1(pi(hkj−1), qj))
, (35)
where y†v1(µ, g) = 0 and y
†
v1
(µ, b) = y†v1(µ) for all µ. Then, the ex-ante probability that an
`-seller remains in the market without having cheated after k-period history hk is
Pr(hk) =
k∏
j=1
[ρ`(qj)(1− y†v1(pi(hkj−1), qj))(1− χ)]. (36)
6Note that this implies V (piBb(µ, y
†
V (µ))) − v1 > pG(µ, y†V (µ)) for all µ ∈ (0, µ¯†). Thus, an h-seller
with any reputation µ > 0 does not restart after trading a bad quality item because the value of updated
reputation exceeds v1 as this inequality shows. However, both types of seller may exit after trading a good
quality item in the initial period if the value of the updated reputation, V †θ (pi
∗
Gg(γ)), falls short of v1.
7In Appendix A.3 of the main article, (31) becomes V †v1(µ) =
∑∞
t=0 δ
t`t(pG(pi
t
Gg(µ), yV (pi
t
Gg(µ)))− `) +
δv1(1−`)+`
1−δ` and thus, (37) becomes V
†
` (µ˜)− v1 <
∑∞
t=0(pG(pi
t
Gg(µ˜), yˆ)− `)δt`t because δv1(1−`)+`1−δ` < v1.
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Consequently, in a stationary state, the measure of nominally k-period old `-sellers
who restart in period k + 1 for k ≥ 1, is
χ1(1− µ1)
( ∑
hk∈Hk
Pr(hk)(1− `)y†v1(pi(hk))(1− χ)
)
.
This implies that the total measure of old `-sellers who restart in an arbitrary period is
χ1(1− µ1)Λ(v1, µ1) where
Λ(v1, µ1) := (1− `)(1− χ)
∞∑
k=1
∑
hk∈Hk
Pr(hk)y†v1(pi(h
k)). (37)
Now, as verified in the discussion preceding Theorem 3 in the main article, the values
of v1 and µ1 in a stationary equilibrium constitute a fixed point that solves
v1 = V
†
v1
(µ1) and µ1 =
γ − γΛ(v1,µ1)
1− γΛ(v1, µ1) . (38)
To show that such a fixed point exists, we need the next result.
Lemma 8 Let ψ : ( `
1−δ ,
1
1−δ ) → C[0,1] be a mapping such that ψ(v1) = V †v1 where C[0,1] is
the set of all continuous functions on [0, 1]. Then, ψ is continuous in v1 under the sup
norm at any v1 >
`
1−δ .
Proof. Since continuity under the sup norm requires uniform convergence, the possibility
of a fixed point having unbounded derivative poses a potential problem. The bulk of the
proof evolves around how to circumvent this problem. We start with two preliminary
claims asserting that p∗G(µ) is of bounded variation on [ε, 1] for any ε > 0 (Claim 1) and
consequently, so is the fixed point V †v1 (Claim 2).
Claim 1 For any ε > 0 there exists Mε > 0 such that ∀v1 ∈ [ `1−δ , 11−δ ), ∀V ∈ F¯v1 ∩
C[0,1], ∀µ and µ′ ∈ (ε, µ¯†v1),
pG(µ
′, y†v1(µ
′))− pG(µ, y†v1(µ))
µ′ − µ ≤Mε. (39)
Proof of Claim 1: Note that we can find k > 0 such that ∂pG
∂µ
> 0 is bounded above
uniformly by k, and ∂pG
∂y
< 0 is bounded below uniformly by −k. Suppose µ < µ′ < µ¯†v1
without loss of generality. If y†v1(µ
′) ≥ y†v1(µ), then
pG(µ
′,y†v1 (µ
′))−pG(µ,y†v1 (µ))
µ′−µ < k because pG
decreases in y, proving (39).
Now suppose that y†v1(µ
′) < y†v1(µ). Note that one can find kε, k˜ε > 0 such that
∂piBb(µ, y)
∂µ
=
(1− h)(1− `)(1− y)
[µ(1− h) + (1− µ)(1− `)(1− y)]2 < kε
∂piBb(µ, y)
∂y
=
(1− h)(1− `)(1− µ)µ
[µ(1− h) + (1− µ)(1− `)(1− y)]2 > k˜ε
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for all µ > ε and y ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, recalling that piBb(µ, y†v1(µ)) is nondecreasing, we deduce
that (using the facts that y†v1(µ
′) < y†v1(µ) and µ < µ
′)
0 ≤ piBb(µ′, y†v1(µ′))− piBb(µ, y†v1(µ)) < kε(µ′ − µ) + k˜ε(y†v1(µ′)− y†v1(µ)),
and consequently,
y†v1(µ
′)− y†v1(µ) > −
kε
k˜ε
(µ′ − µ).
Therefore, we have
pG(µ
′, y†v1(µ
′))− pG(µ, y†v1(µ)) < k(µ′ − µ)− k
(
y†v1(µ
′)− y†v1(µ)
)
< k
(
1 +
kε
k˜ε
)
(µ′ − µ).
We complete the proof by setting Mε = k
(
1 + kε
k˜ε
)
. 
Claim 2 For any ε > 0 and v1 ∈ [ `1−δ , 11−δ ),
D+V †v1(µ) := lim sup
µ′↓µ
V †v1(µ
′)− V †v1(µ)
µ′ − µ ≤
Mε
1− δh ∀µ > ε.
Proof of Claim 2: For given v1 there exists µ > 0 defined by V
†
v1
(pi∗Gg(µ)) = v1, so that
V †v1(µ) =
{
pG(µ, y
†
v1
(µ)) + δv1 if µ ≤ µ
pG(µ, y
†
v1
(µ)) + δ(`V †v1(pi
∗
Gg(µ)) + (1− `)v1) if µ ≥ µ.
(40)
To prove the claim we first show that D+V †v1(µ) is uniformly bounded. To reach a con-
tradiction, suppose that for any K > 0 one can find µK > ε such that D
+V †v1(µK) > K.
Then, since pi∗Gg(µ) is differentiable and
`
h
≤ ∂pi
∗
Gg(µ)
∂µ
≤ h
`
, (39) and (40) would imply
that µK > µ when K is sufficiently large and that one can construct a sequence µn → 1
where µn = pi
∗
Gg(µn−1) and µ2 = pi
∗
Gg(µK). Consider τ < ∞ such that piτGg(ε) > µ¯. By
choosing K arbitrarily large, one can ensure that D+V †v1(pi
τ
Gg(µK)) is arbitrarily large while
pi∗Gg(µn−1) > µ¯
†. But, this is impossible because D+V †v1(µ) is bounded for µ > µ¯
† as can
be verified from
V †v1(µ) =
[ ∞∑
t=0
`tδtpG(pi
t
Gg(µ), 1)
]
+ δv1(1− `)
∞∑
t=0
`tδt, (41)
a formula derived from y†v1(µ) = 1 for µ > µ¯
†. Hence, we conclude that D+V †v1(µ) is
uniformly bounded for µ > ε and thus, (39) and (40) imply
D+V †v1(µ) ≤ Mε + `δ
(
sup
µ>ε
D+V †v1(µ)
)(
max
µ
∂pi∗Gg(µ)
∂µ
)
≤ Mε + hδ
(
sup
µ>ε
D+V †v1(µ)
)
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for µ > ε where the second inequality follows from
∂pi∗Gg(µ)
∂µ
≤ h/`. Thus, D+V †v1(µ) ≤ Mε1−δh
if µ > ε. 
Next, choose v1 ∈ ( `1−δ , 11−δ ). Notice that for a sufficiently small η > 0, in particular
smaller than v1 − `1−δ , the operator Tv1 can be extended to F¯ηv1 ∩ C[0,1] where F¯ηv1 :=
∪v1−η≤v≤v1+ηF¯v. As an intermediate step, we need:
Claim 3 For v1 ∈ ( `1−δ , 11−δ ), the operator
Tv1 : F¯ηv1 ∩ C[0,1] → C[0,1] is continuous in sup norm. (42)
Proof of Claim 3: Consider V, V ′ ∈ F¯ηv1 ∩ C[0,1] such that maxµ∈[0,1] |V ′(µ)− V (µ)| < .
Since y†V (µ) and y
†
V ′(µ) are, by construction, the solutions to
min
0≤y≤1
∣∣pG(µ, y)− δ(max{v1, V (piBb(µ, y))} − v1)∣∣ (43)
and the same equation with V ′ instead of V , respectively, it follows that |pG(µ, y†V ′(µ))−
pG(µ, y
†
V (µ))| < . From (34), therefore, we deduce that
max
µ∈[0,1]
|Tv1(V ′)(µ)− Tv1(V )(µ)| < + δ,
which establishes (42). 
Given v1 ∈ ( `1−δ , 11−δ ) and η small as specified above, consider small |κ| < η/2 and any
V ∈ F¯ηv1 ∩ F¯ηv1+κ ∩ C[0,1]. By (43), the value of pG(µ, y†V (µ)) differs when calculated for Tv1
and when calculated for Tv1+κ, and the difference is at most δκ. Thus, from (34),
Tv1(V )(µ)− 2|δκ| ≤ Tv1+κ(V )(µ) ≤ Tv1(V )(µ) + 2|δκ| ∀µ ∈ [0, 1]. (44)
In particular, observe that
Tv1(V
†
v1+κ)(µ)− 2|δκ| ≤ Tv1+κ(V †v1+κ)(µ) = V †v1+κ(µ) ≤ Tv1(V †v1+κ)(µ) + 2|δκ|.
Finally, to prove continuity of ψ at v1, we decompose the argument into two parts:
First, we prove uniform convergence of functions ψ(v1 + κ) = V
†
v1+κ to ψ(v1) = V
†
v1
as
κ → 0 on intervals [ε, 1], then do the same separately on [0, 2ε]. The continuity will be
established by combining the two parts.
a) We know from Claim 2 that on the interval [ε, 1] , the function V †v1+κ is Kε-Lipschitz
where Kε =
Mε
1−δh . Then from Ascoli-Arzela` Theorem (see Royden (1988)), the subset
consisting of all Kε-Lipschitz function of F¯ηv1 is compact under the sup norm. Hence, there
exists a sequence of fixed points V †v1+κ such that, when restricted to the domain [ε, 1], it
converges as κ→ 0 to a limit, denoted by W [ε,1]v1 , continuous on [ε, 1] and
V †v1+κ
unif−→ W [ε,1]v1 under the sup norm on [ε, 1] for any ε > 0. (45)
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Let V
†[ε,1]
v1+κ denote V
†
v1+κ restricted on [ε, 1] and let V˜
†[ε,1]
v1+κ denote the continuous linear
extension of V
†[ε,1]
v1+κ on [0, ε]. Then, by (42) and (44),
Tv1(lim
κ→0
V˜
†[ε,1]
v1+κ )(µ) ≤ limκ→0Tv1+κ(V˜
†[ε,1]
v1+κ )(µ) ≤ Tv1(limκ→0 V˜
†[ε,1]
v1+κ )(µ). (46)
Note that Tv1(limκ→0 V˜
†[ε,1]
v1+κ )(µ) for each µ is fully determined by limκ→0 V˜
†[ε,1]
v1+κ restricted
on [µ, 1] according to (34), and the same is true for Tv1+κ(V˜
†[ε,1]
v1+κ ). Since V˜
†[ε,1]
v1+κ = V
†
v1+κ on
[ε, 1] by definition, therefore, (45) and (46) imply that
Tv1(W˜
[ε,1]
v1
)(µ) ≤ W˜ [ε,1]v1 (µ) ≤ Tv1(W˜ [ε,1]v1 )(µ) for all µ ∈ [ε, 1],
where W˜
[ε,1]
v1 is the continuous linear extension of W
[ε,1]
v1 on [0, ε]. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary
and V †v1 is the only function V that satisfies Tv1(V )(µ) = V (µ) on [ε, 1] for all ε ∈ (0, 1)
by uniqueness of the fixed point of Tv1 , it further follows that W˜
[ε,1]
v1 = V
†
v1
on [ε, 1], i.e.,
W
[ε,1]
v1 coincides with V
†
v1
on [ε, 1]. From (45), therefore,
V †v1+κ
unif−→ V †v1 under the sup norm on [ε, 1] for any ε > 0. (47)
b) Note, however, that this is not sufficient for uniform convergence on [0, 1]. Hence,
choose ε > 0 small enough such that V †v1(pi
∗
Gg(2ε)) < v1. Then, because V
†
v1+κ converges to
V †v1 under the sup norm on [ε, 1] by (47), we have V
†
v1+κ(pi
∗
Gg(2ε)) < v1 + κ for sufficiently
small κ. But this implies that V †v1+κ(pi
∗
Gg(µ)) < v1 + κ for all µ ≤ 2ε for sufficiently small
κ, and consequently, V †v1+κ(µ) = pG(µ, 1) + δ(v1 + κ) on [0, 2ε], which converges uniformly
to V †v1(µ) = pG(µ, 1) + δv1. Thus,
V †v1+κ
unif−→ V †v1under the sup norm on [0, 2ε]. (48)
Combining (47) and (48), we obtain uniform convergence under the sup norm on the entire
domain [0, 1], which proves continuity of ψ at v1 and thus, Lemma 8.
Recall that y†v1(µ) uniquely solves
pG(µ, y
†
v1
(µ)) = δ
(
V †v1(piBb(µ, y
†
v1
(µ)))− v1
)
if pG(µ, 1) ≤ δ∆v1 , and
y†v1(µ) = 1 otherwise.
By an analogous argument as in the proof of Theorem 1 (of the main article), y†v1(µ) is
continuous in v1 and in µ.
To complete the proof of Theorem 3, consider a mapping from [ `+ε
1−δ ,
1−ε
1−δ ] × [0, γ] into
itself as below for sufficiently small ε > 0:(
v1
µ1
)
7−→
(
max
{
V †v1(µ1),
`+ε
1−δ
}
γ−γΛ(v1,µ1)
1−γΛ(v1,µ1)
)
.
Since this mapping is continuous as explained above, there is a fixed point by Brouwer’s
Fixed Point Theorem.
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Note that, for given v1 close to
`
1−δ , the solution value to µ1 =
γ−γΛ(v1,µ1)
1−γΛ(v1,µ1) remains
bounded away from zero (because Λ(v1,µ1) is bounded away from 1 by (37)) and satisfies
V †v1(µ1) >
`+ε
1−δ . Moreover, V
†
v1
(µ1) < V
†
v1
(γ) < pG(γ,
h−`
1−` ) + δ(v1 + ∆v1) <
1−ε
1−δ by (33).
Hence the fixed point value of v1 satisfies v1 ∈ ( `+ε1−δ , 1−ε1−δ ).
Let µ1 and v1 denote a fixed point of the mapping. To establish the existence of an
equilibrium, we still need to show that it is optimal for h-type sellers to always report
truthfully as long as µ ≥ µ1. Since the continuation value of h-type sellers after cheating
is the equilibrium value at the entry level, denoted by V †h (µ1), rather than V
†
h (0), the
optimality condition of h-type sellers is more involved to verify than when restarting is
impossible.
However, in the proof of Proposition 1 of this Online Appendix, we showed that if (1)
holds then the slope of V ∗h is larger than the slope of V
∗
` at all level of reputation and
consequently, the sorting condition (2) holds. The same reasoning applies to the current
case to verify that
V †h (µ)− V †h (µ1) > V †v1(µ)− V †v1(µ1) ∀µ > µ1.
Therefore, if (1) holds then it constitutes an equilibrium for `-type sellers to announce
according to y†v1(µ) and for h-type sellers to always announce honestly for µ ≥ µ1, provided
that δ(V †h (1)− V †h (µ1)) ≥ 1.8
Lastly, to show that δ(V †h (1)− V †h (µ1)) ≥ 1, as µ1 < γ and y†v1 > yˆ we obtain
V †h (µ1) < hpG
(
γ,
h− `
1− `
)
+ δhV †h (piGg(γ)) + δ (1− h)V †h (1).
As pG(µ,
h−`
1−` ) =
µ(h−`)+`
h
, by extending the formula recursively we get
V †h (µ1) <
∞∑
t=0
δtht
(
pitGg (γ) (h− `) + `
)
+
δ (1− h)
1− δh
h
1− δ
=
∞∑
t=0
δtht
(
γht+1 + (1− γ) `t+1
γht + (1− γ) `t
)
+
δ (1− h)
1− δh
h
1− δ
where the equality follows from pitGg (γ) =
γht
γht+(1−γ)`t . Then, as V
†
h (1) = h/ (1− δ),
δ
(
V †h (1)− V †h (µ1)
)
> δ
(
h
1− δh −
∞∑
t=0
δtht
(
γht+1 + (1− γ) `t+1
γht + (1− γ) `t
))
= δ
( ∞∑
t=0
δtht
(
h− γh
t+1 + (1− γ) `t+1
γht + (1− γ) `t
))
= δ
( ∞∑
t=0
δtht (1− γ) `t
(
h− `
γht + (1− γ) `t
))
.
8The proof is omitted because it is the same as the proof of Proposition 1 of this online Appendix with
obvious changes, such as v1 and µ¯
† in place of V ∗` (0) and µ¯, respectively.
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Taking the limit as δ → 1,
V †h (1)− V †h (µ1) ≥
∞∑
t=0
(1− γ)`t
(
h− `
γ + (1− γ)(`/h)t
)
(49)
> (h− `)
[
1− γ +
∞∑
1
(1− γ)`t
γ + (1− γ)(`/h)t
]
> (h− `)
[
1− γ + (1− γ)`
(1− `)(γ + (1− γ)(`/h))
]
→ (h− `)
(
1 +
h
1− `
)
as γ → 0.
Therefore, δ(V †h (1) − V †h (µ1)) ≥ 1 holds for sufficiently large δ if γ is sufficiently small,
so long as h > h†(`) where h†(`) ∈ (`, 1) is a solution to (h − `)(1 + h
1−`
)
= 1. This
completes the proof of existence of an equilibrium as stated in Theorem 3. Note that the
lower bound of h above which an honest equilibrium exists decreases as the sum (49) is
expanded beyond t = 1.
3.2 Proof that y†(µ) > y∗(µ).
Observe from ∆v1 < ∆ that µ¯
†
v1
< µ¯. It is immediate from the definition of µ¯†v1 that
y†v1(µ) = 1 for all µ ≥ µ¯†v1 . Hence, we consider µ < µ¯†v1 < µ¯ below.
It is straightforward to extend the relevant arguments in the proof of Proposition 1
of the main article, to verify that y†v1 is continuous and y
†
v1
(µ) ∈ (0, 1) for µ < µ¯†v1 . To
reach a contradiction, suppose y†v1(µ
′) = y∗(µ′) for some µ′ < µ¯†v1 and y
†
v1
(µ) > y∗(µ) for
all µ ∈ (µ′, µ¯). Then,
δ
(
V ∗` (piBb(µ
′, y∗(µ′)))− V ∗` (0)
)
= pG(µ
′, y∗(µ′))
= pG(µ
′, y†v1(µ
′)) = δ
(
V †v1(piBb(µ
′, y†v1(µ
′)))− v1
)
and thus,
V ∗` (µ˜)− V ∗` (0) = V †v1(µ˜)− v1 where µ˜ := piBb(µ′, y∗(µ′)) > µ′ (50)
and the inequality is from Lemma 5 of Appendix A.3. Furthermore, since
V ∗` (µ˜) = pG(µ˜, y
∗(µ˜)) + δ
(
`V ∗` (pi
∗
Gg(µ˜)) + (1− `)V ∗` (0)
)
and (51)
V †v1(µ˜) = pG(µ˜, y
†
v1
(µ˜)) + δ
(
`V †v1(pi
∗
Gg(µ˜)) + (1− `)v1
)
(52)
while pG(µ˜, y
∗(µ˜)) ≥ pG(µ˜, y†v1(µ˜)), (50)–(52) would imply
δ`((V ∗` (pi
∗
Gg(µ˜))− V ∗` (0))− (V †v1(pi∗Gg(µ˜))− v1)) ≤ (δ − 1)(v1 − V ∗` (0)) < 0. (53)
Since V ∗` (1) − V ∗` (0) = ∆ > ∆v1 = V †v1(1) − v1, there must exist µ′′ ∈ [µ˜, 1) such that
V ∗` (µ
′′)− V ∗` (0) ≤ V †v1(µ′′)− v1 and V ∗` (µ)− V ∗` (0) > V †v1(µ)− v1 for all µ > µ′′. However,
since pG(µ
′′, y∗(µ′′)) ≥ pG(µ′′, y†v1(µ′′)) and pi∗Gg(µ′′) > µ′′, (51) and (52) evaluated at µ = µ′′
imply that V ∗` (µ
′′)−δV ∗` (0) > V †v1(µ′′)−δv1 and consequently, V ∗` (µ′′)−V ∗` (0) > V †v1(µ′′)−v1,
contradicting the definition of µ′′. This completes the proof.
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